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Abstract One of the key roles of the English National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) is
technology appraisal. This essentially involves evaluating
the cost effectiveness of pharmaceutical products and other
technologies for use within the National Health Service.
Based on a content analysis of key documents which shed
light on the nature of appraisals, this paper draws attention
to the multiple layers of uncertainty and complexity
which are latent within the appraisal process, and the
often socially constructed mechanisms for tackling these.
Epistemic assumptions, bounded rationality and more
explicitly relational forms of managing knowledge are
applied to this end. These findings are discussed in the
context of the literature highlighting the inherently social
process of regulation. A framework is developed which
posits the various forms of uncertainty, and responses to
these, as potential conduits of regulatory bias—in need of
further research. That NICE’s authority is itself regulated
by other actors within the regulatory regime, particularly
the pharmaceutical industry, exposes it to the threat of
regulatory capture. Following Lehoux, it is concluded that
a more transparent and reflexive format for technological
appraisals is necessary. This would enable a more robust,
defensible form of decision-making and moreover enable
NICE to preserve its legitimacy in the midst of pressures
which threaten this.
Keywords Alzheimer’s  Complexity  Hope 
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Introduction: the politicisation of uncertainty
In his seminal examination of the modern regulatory state
in Britain, Moran (2003) describes the transition away from
a stable governing compact based on ‘club rule’ to a period
of hyper-innovation which occurred towards the end of the
twentieth century. In this latter phase, a number of factors
acting on the British system made it ‘‘uniquely pioneering’’
(Moran 2003, p. 155) in the ‘‘drive to subject areas of life
not previously formally controlled to formal regulation
with the aim of more synoptic legibility’’ (ibid., p. 153).
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence1 emerged
towards the end of this period of bureaucratic modernisa-
tion (thus fallings outside Moran’s assessment) in April
1999, and in a number of ways epitomises many of the
features of the late-modern British regulatory state. NICE’s
evidence-based approach, whether applied as clinical
guidance or in the form of cost-containment recommen-
dations, has elicited esteem from both sides of the Atlantic
(Wall Street Journal 2009). Yet in this latter role, through
making explicit the difficult decisions of healthcare
rationing which are an inevitable part of a state-funded
healthcare system, the institute faces legitimacy problems
in England and Wales (Brown and Calnan 2010).
The implicit compact—between government, clinicians
and public—by which the NHS initially functioned has
been consistently weakened since the 1960s, and subjected
to heightened strains post-1997 (Ham and Alberti 2002).
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One of the central bases of this informal system of running
the NHS was that the government determined the overall
budget for the NHS whilst individual clinicians—GP gate-
keepers and hospital consultants—decided healthcare
priorities. The basic economic problem of healthcare—
limited resources and ever-increasing demand—was in this
way negotiated ‘‘through localized discretionary decisions
of clinicians known as dilution’’ (Crinson 2004, p. 34). Yet
because the legitimacy of any process of decision-making
is always indirect and achieved in relation to other
authorities (Habermas 1976, p. 101), a decline in the
authority and esteem of medical professionals—at least in
the eyes of policy-makers (Alaszewski 2002)—rendered
this ad-hoc process of resource decisions increasingly
untenable.
This perceived decline in professional authority, com-
bined with other features of the NHS such as variations in
care (Calman and Hine 1995) and spiralling costs across
the service overall and for certain interventions in partic-
ular (Crinson 2004), led to the inauguration of a more
formal means of regulating (limiting, assuring and adju-
dicating between) the availability of certain treatments as
prescribed within the NHS. Yet a fundamental paradox
surrounding NICE is that, in replacing the previous local/
informal model of decision-making with a more bureau-
cratic regulatory apparatus, new layers of subjectivity and
policy meddling have been introduced: ‘‘the new regula-
tory state, so often identified with the rise of neutral,
non-majoritarian decision-making, has actually exposed
hitherto ‘non-political’ domains to the power of elected
politicians’’ (Moran 2003, p. 125). This politicisation is
clearly apparent in interventions which have pre-empted
(e.g Herceptin and beta-interferon) or legally contested
(e.g donepezil) NICE recommendations on particular
technologies.
A guiding assumption of this paper is that the authority
of NICE—as a regulator—is itself regulated by socio-
political and economic phenomena which in turn are
strongly influenced by other actors (Brown and Calnan
2010), not least the mass media and the pharmaceutical
industry. The regulatory regime within which NICE func-
tions is therefore best understood as ‘polycentric’ (Black
2008); one where there are multiple state and non-state
actors, obscured boundaries of power and knowledge, and
which is ‘‘marked by fragmentation, complexity and inter-
dependence between actors’’ (ibid., p. 1). So whilst a much
more formal, centralised and (prima facie) transparent
system of rationing has to some extent replaced the pre-
vious ‘club system’ of governance and resource decision-
making (Moran 2003, p. 140), this new process is still
highly and unavoidably relational, institutionally and
socially embedded (Black 2008), and rife with uncertainty
(Brown and Calnan 2010).
This latter, intractable feature of uncertainty attests to
the limits of regulators in adjudicating between a range of
competing concerns (Fuller 1978). Following a brief con-
sideration of these competing interests and their relation to
NICE decision-making, the thematic analysis which forms
the core of this paper will be presented in describing a
range of layers and forms of uncertainty which are more or
less implicit within NICE appraisals (epistemic assump-
tions, bounded rationality, and relational forms of manag-
ing knowledge). These empirical findings then act as the
basis of an extended discussion which develops a con-
ceptual framework for future research; one concerned with
the modes by which such uncertainties may form the basis
of unforeseen and/or undesirable influence on, or capture
of, NICE decisions. These influences may happen either
more explicitly, where technical process may be legally
challenged (Fuller 1978, pp. 387–388), or implicitly, where
attempts to bridge over uncertainty privilege certain
interests over others (Milewa 2008). A concluding section
argues that while the problems of uncertainty are absorbed
yet never fully solved by institutions such as NICE, regu-
latory formats which openly acknowledge and debate the
multiple interests and values which are at stake (Lehoux
2006) may serve to heighten public legitimacy (Milewa
2008) and reduce the scope for technocratic challenges
which subvert and skew effective decision-making.
Reconciling interests? Muddling through amidst
exposed uncertainty
While the unknowables latent within bio-medical/phar-
macological research and its application are far from novel,
late-modern society is increasingly sensitive to such
uncertainty (Taylor-Gooby 2000). Similarly the rationing
typically assumed as inherent to public healthcare provi-
sion (c.f. Light and Hughes 2001) has become more
explicit through public debate about the welfare state and
the transition from local-informal to national-formal
decisions invoked via NICE. In response to the augmented
public scrutiny which has followed (as well as a legal
ruling following the contesting of NICE’s decision
regarding donepezil), the institute has made its appraisal
format, calculations approach and cost-effectiveness
threshold more transparent. Such accountability demands
imposed on regulating agencies are far from unusual and
reflect a wider, late-modern tendency—as referred to by
Black (2008, pp. 10–11), following Power (2005)—where
institutions are ‘‘turned ‘inside out’… the details of their
internal decision-making structures and processes, includ-
ing their incentive structures, audit and risk management
processes, are seen as critically relevant to those outside
them’’. Thus the use of bureaucracy and proceduralism
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applied in attempting to ‘absorb uncertainty’ (Habermas
1976, p. 98) may actually serve to politicise decision-
making and expose further uncertainty therein.
One explanation of this phenomenon is that the exis-
tence of NICE galvanises a ‘logic of collective action’
(Olson 1965) by which homogenous groups which stand to
benefit from newly illuminated decisions are especially
influential (see Meadowcroft 2008). The politicisation of
decisions and demands for transparency by these groups
highlight a range of contestable components within
appraisals, pressurising NICE to change its approach and
concede ground to these interests (Hedgecoe 2004,
pp. 140–141). In contrast ‘‘more dispersed, heterogeneous
groups for whom the costs of collective organization will
be high’’ (Meadowcroft 2008, p. 434)—those who stand to
lose from the disinvestment by PCTs in other services
resulting from NICE recommended technologies—are
much less active and therefore the uncertainty and arbi-
trariness around such disinvestment remains largely
obscured.
With regard to this latter uncertainty, the blanket
determining of what is affordable for the NHS as set out by
NICE may result in recommendations against the pre-
scribing of certain drugs which could otherwise be afforded
by some local Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Conversely
NICE decisions may also compel other Trusts to forego
other important services (undermining equity of access in
certain areas) in order to be able to provide a particular
product recommended by NICE (which PCTs are legally
required to provide as a result). Which technologies are
‘disinvested’ in is of course very much at the discretion of
local Trusts. The only way of preventing this enforced
inequity/variation in care would be to: (a) ensure more
equitable and efficient allocation and spending of money
across the NHS; and moreover (b) to have a comprehensive
threshold ruling and therefore cost-effectiveness appraisal
of every aspect of healthcare treatment and technology
provided across the entire NHS.
As Lindblom (1959, p. 79) makes apparent in his classic
commentary on public administration: such a ‘root and
branch’2 review ‘‘would of course require a prodigious
inquiry into values held by society and an equally prodi-
gious set of calculations on how much of each value is
equal to how much of each other value’’ (ibid. 1959:79).
Thus as far as a fully rigorous assurance of equitable access
to treatment is concerned, this ‘‘is of course impossible.
It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of informa-
tion that men [and NICE] simply do not possess’’ (ibid.,
p. 79). Given this impossibility of perfect decision-making
(technically and normatively), Lindblom asserts that
organisations such as NICE inevitably limit themselves to
‘‘the politically or legally possible—restrict their attention
to relatively few values and relatively few alternative
policies’’ (ibid., p. 79). Intrinsic to appraisals therefore are
the profound assumptions of ‘constructed’ economic
models (Light and Hughes 2001) and the ‘‘vacuum where
the possible treatments for one condition are assessed
relative to one another but without reference to alternative
uses of those resources to treat other conditions’’
(Meadowcroft 2008).
This ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 1959) of institu-
tional decision-making is less benign than the term implies.
Due to the multiple actors involved in polycentric regula-
tory regimes such as that of NICE’s technological
appraisals, the influence upon judgements and recommen-
dations can be described as ‘‘pluralistic, though grossly
lopsided’’ (Lindblom 1979, p. 525; Fuller 1978). Not only
may homogenous, well organised and resourced groups
exert disproportionate influence (Meadowcroft 2008), but
other interests may be ‘built in’ to the process. As Brown
and Webster underline (2004, p. 181), new technologies
‘‘are saturated with talk of breakthroughs, advances, future
visions and great leaps forward’’—it is impossible for those
making regulatory decisions to detach products from the
compelling stories they are associated with. Because reg-
ulation and its means of coping with uncertainty remain
profoundly relational (Black 2008), the potential influence
of interests within these social processes requires signifi-
cant investigation.
Abraham (1995) delineates a number of potential
interest configurations, noting the corporate bias apparent
through many of the regulatory mechanisms for drug
safety and pricing (Abraham 2009). While NICE would
seem to have been created in the public interest (opti-
mising NHS provision) this stance should not be taken for
granted. Regulatory regimes may be ‘captured’ by certain
private interests or, more fundamentally, may be shaped
by private interests in their inception and design. Corpo-
ratist and Marxist theories of regulation suggest, respec-
tively, that states may share interests with industry or that
public interests may be misconstrued as congruent with
manufacturers. Linkages between NICE and the state, its
clear tendency towards approving technologies (Abraham
2009, p. 111), and its partial reliance on industry data
(Brown and Calnan 2010) underline the importance of
investigating the avenues of uncertainty through which
influence may occur.
The study
The central sections of this paper draw on a content
analysis of a selection of NICE documents to explore and
describe these avenues or forms of uncertainty. While the2 In the full sense of the term.
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analysis was informed by a wide range of documents
made available on the NICE website—the content analysis
presented here focuses around three in particular.
Firstly, there is the Final Appraisal Determination (FAD)
given for ‘Alzheimer’s disease—donepezil, galantamine,
rivastigmine & memantine’ (NICE 2006). The sheer vol-
ume of documents made available relating to the decision-
making process around this particular set of drugs created
the need to narrow down and focus on a smaller amount
of text. This document assimilates a wide range of sub-
mitted information and is analysed here as a means of
understanding the modes by which NICE committees
manage knowledge within the appraisal process. This
appraisal has been chosen for its particular salience to the
themes raised thus far: on the one hand it was an appraisal
which took the relatively rare stance against recom-
mending the technology, thus showing apparent resistance
to influence; on the other, the appraisal decision was
contested in the courts, with the case contesting uncer-
tainty around the economic modelling and procedures
applied by NICE (Dyer 2007).
On their own, FAD documents provide a rather disem-
bodied and bureaucratically ‘sanitised’ account of the
decision-making process. In order to develop a better
understanding of the ‘backstage’ of decision-making—two
further documents are made use of: the ‘Report of
Threshold Workshop’ (NICE 2009) enables deeper insights
into how the threshold is applied within NICE appraisal
committees and moreover how it is viewed by key actors
from within the institute and beyond; the transcript of a
relatively candid interview given by Sir Ian Kennedy
(2009), regarding his research into the way NICE deals
with innovative health technologies, sheds light on the
backstage salience of sectional interests and certain aspects
of interpersonal interactions.
These three documents were initially coded in terms of
cases of where uncertainty was indicated—either as a latent
or more explicit phenomenon. These aspects of uncertainty
were then re-coded in terms of the nature of the uncertainty
as well as the ways in which this uncertainty was approa-
ched or ‘assumed away’ within the decision-making pro-
cess. ‘Thick’ (or broad) codes relating to ‘epistemic
assumptions’, ‘bounded rationality’, and ‘trust in proce-
dures, norms and personalities’ were derived from this first
stage of analysis. The material was then revisited and
coded around these axial themes and consequently further
sub-codes within these themes became apparent. The cases
of uncertainty were then revisited and compared in terms of
further clarifying the aptness of the codes and refining the
conceptual framework (Neuman 2000). We now turn to an
overview of the findings of this content analysis, using a




System trust in empirical science
The most fundamental of assumptions on which the
NICE appraisal process functions is that of the episte-
mological concreteness of ‘biomedicine’. Although a
range of theoretical and empirical routes towards con-
testing this exist, ontological suppositions as to the
existence of a physiological reality and corresponding
notions of health and illness, alongside uncontested
epistemologies where the ability of biomedicine to
develop effective knowledge about this reality (e.g Alz-
heimer’s disease) and refine this over time, are utterly
intrinsic to the functioning of NICE and remained com-
pletely uncontested within the documentation analysed.
So whilst headings such as ‘Evidence and Interpretation’
(NICE 2006, p. 7) allude to the potential limitations of
knowledge and its ability to represent ‘reality’, no sub-
stantive means of confronting these assumptions is
apparent.
In many senses of course this recourse through the
validity of science is entirely rational—indeed the section
on ‘bounding rationality’ will note the inherent need for
reducing complexity as a means to practical decision-
making. NICE appraisal decisions are already incredibly
intricate endeavours, without adding further layers of
philosophical uncertainty. Hence confidence or ‘system
trust’ in biomedicine—where its elemental limitations are
not even considered—is an effective tool by which com-
plexity is warded against (Luhmann 1979). So long as
positive feedback is forthcoming in terms of treatment
development, and in the absence of any glaring negative
feedback, ‘system trust’ in the validity of biomedicine and
its techniques for ‘knowing’ would seem to represent a
useful foundation on which the appraisal process is built.
Yet these necessary parameters and assumptions are
nonetheless grounded in ‘‘notions of status and authority’’
which may ‘‘intervene to shape and truncate deliberation’’,
thus undermining the process and potentially meaning
decisions are unduly influenced by certain more powerful
interests (Milewa 2008, p. 361).
This picture begins to appear more problematic in the
way that the scientific knowledge upon which decisions are
made is rooted almost entirely in the randomised controlled
trial. There exists a growing literature which makes
apparent the limitations of RCTs—the key points of which
are neatly summed up by Harrison (2009, p. 192; see also
Busfield 2006) in his critique of ‘scientific bureaucratic
medicine’: that evidence is constituted in terms of
‘‘somewhat narrow physiological parameters’’, with a
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corresponding ambivalence to the psycho-social, and
where ‘evidence’ of interventions typically carried out in
well resourced teaching hospitals in urban environments is
then generalised across entire populations. Yet the way
RCT findings are handled by NICE committees tends to
overlook these short-comings:
The quality of the reporting and methods of the
included published randomised controlled trials
(RCTs) of the AChE inhibitors (donepezil, galanta-
mine and rivastigmine) was mixed (NICE 2006, p. 7).
Although the excerpt above makes a clear acknowl-
edgement of the variable quality of RCTs, this qualifica-
tion is done within understandings of what makes a good
RCT, not in anyway calling into question the wider
validity of RCTs in terms of their more inherent
limitations:
Six RCTs reviewed by the Assessment Group showed
a statistically significant improvement in cognition
following treatment with donepezil compared with
placebo, as assessed using the ADAS-cog scale.
Higher doses of donepezil were associated with
increasing benefit (NICE 2006, p. 7).
Similarly, the findings referred to in this excerpt are
described in terms of the usage of the ‘Alzheimer Disease
Assessment Scale’ tool for assessing cognitive functioning,
with no recognition of the likely limitations of this and
other scales (e.g Mini Mental State Examination) in
reflecting either what is clinically meaningful (Thomas
2004; Wilkinson 2004) or, more importantly, what is
relevant to patients’ day-to-day lives. Although the MMSE
is often used due to being widely available, free and easily
administered by non-medics, this cannot be equated with
its efficacy in terms of accuracy (especially towards more
severe diagnoses of dementia) or its construct validity in
relation to lived experience. Once again these not insig-
nificant limitations are not acknowledged. Practically
speaking it would seem easier to assume away these
imperfections rather than have no straightforward mecha-
nism of comparison whatsoever.
System trust in publications
Within discussions of evidence in the report, there were
frequent and clear distinctions made between: that evi-
dence which was published; manufacturers’ data which
remained unpublished; and review papers. An example of
this distinction is visible in the following excerpt within the
considerations of cost effectiveness:
Four RCTs assessed the effect of rivastigmine com-
pared with placebo on the CIBIC-plus scale. In the
two published RCTs, statistically significant mean
improvements were recorded following treatment
with rivastigmine in the high-dose—licensed –regi-
men only, compared with placebo… For the two
trials, 16–20% of participants treated with placebo
were judged to have responded versus 30–57% of
those treated with rivastigmine. A statistically sig-
nificant difference was found for the high-dose regi-
men only (NICE 2006, p. 17).
The clear distinction which is being made between
published and non-published, as visible in the above
excerpt, is typical of that which is made throughout the
document—intimating a legitimacy attached to that which
has been through the rigours of peer review in contrast to
data which has not been published in academic journals:
Cost estimates in the model were taken from pub-
lished UK data (NICE 2006, p. 27).
Implicit within this assessment are assumptions that
published data is: (a) more robust in a scientific sense; and,
stemming from this first assumption, (b) less prone to bias
than that which is produced by manufacturers:
Twenty-one published economic evaluations of the
three AChE inhibitors and memantine were available
to the Appraisal Committee. All four manufacturers
also submitted their own economic evaluations
(NICE 2006, p. 24).
The highly rationalised presentation of evidence given
in the FAD suggests a level of objectivism which is not
concretely reiterated in the other two documents. Within
the Threshold Workshop minutes, a professor who has
chaired many appraisal committees describes the cost-
effectiveness models as:
…detailed thought experiments with multiple vari-
ables open to manipulation (NICE 2009, p. 10).
In light of this comment, key issues which are not
explicitly raised include the inherent tendency within the
journal publications system towards publishing manufac-
turer sponsored trials (Horton 2004). A former editor of the
British Medical Journal notes the myriad ways in which
financial interests of journals make them more likely to
publish studies funded by pharmaceutical companies as
well as the highly selective manner in which drug com-
panies can manage the ‘favourability’ of the evidence
which reaches publication (Smith 2005). So whilst ‘‘read-
ers [including NICE panels] see randomised controlled
trials as one of the highest forms of evidence… studies
funded by a company were four times more likely to have
results favourable to the company than studies funded from
other sources’’ (ibid., p. 138).
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Suspending doubts about the interests of the industry
In a similar sense to confidence in science and RCTs
more generally, the continued positive feedback, prima
facie, from using hierarchies of knowledge (constituted
around the soundness of published evidence) within the
decision-making process ensures a ‘system trust’ in the
publications process which facilitates inferences about the
quality of data—entailing that concerns to the contrary
(regarding validity and reliability) are ‘assumed away’.
This mode of a ‘suspension’ of doubts over the possibility
of negative or skewed outcomes is central to the process
of trust (Mo¨llering 2001a, b) and would seem to charac-
terise aspects of NICE’s relationship with the pharma-
ceutical industry (Brown and Calnan 2010). Indeed the
FAD account suggests a level of confidence in the
validity of published evidence where doubts are not even
entertained.
When it comes to more direct considerations of the
pharmaceutical industry however, it is clear that significant
doubts do exist:
I was quite taken by some of the submissions and
certainly some the workshops by the … you can
almost taste a kind of state of undeclared war
between Pharma and NICE and I was surprised, and
what I’ve tried to say in the report is that we need
some detente here, we need some mutual under-
standing (Kennedy 2009, p. 1).
The selective publication and ‘burying’ of unfavourable
evidence by the industry (Smith 2005) is relatively well
recognised—hence the clear conflict of interests between
the objectives of NICE and those of the industry. Yet the
bureaucratic process of the FAD appears, ostensibly at
least, to leave this ‘culture’ of diverging interests to one
side. Partly this would seem to be based on a confidence in
the capabilities of the publishing system in overcoming
such biases—one that has been seen here to be misplaced.
But moreover there is pragmatic aspect to appraisals by
which the evidence has to be taken (more or less) at face
value, otherwise any kind of appraisal would be unwork-
able. It is to this expedient or bounded rationality, where
certain levels of uncertainty and complexity are more
explicitly warded against, that we now turn to in the next
section.
Bounding rationality
A ‘Science’ of muddling through?
As was noted in the literature review above, given the
impossibility of root and branch reviews, Lindblom
(1959) suggests that organisations such as NICE tend to
‘muddle through’ the decision-making process in a prag-
matic, as much as a scientific, mode. The work of Herbert
Simon (1982) helps further clarify the nature of this
pragmatic bureaucracy through the concept of ‘bounded
rationality’. This notion can be partly characterised as
pertaining to the benefits of ‘docility’ (Simon 1982,
p. 202): That decision-making is streamlined by assuming
certain ideas via instruction (from socialised-scientific
norms, bureaucratic stipulation and the like), rather than
empirical investigation and contestation of every single
case or eventuality.
‘‘Epistemic assumptions’’ section noted the relatively
‘unaware’ aspects of docility which are implicit within the
NICE appraisal process—those which are taken for gran-
ted. However NICE is also highly active in designing and
applying its decision-making boundaries in a much more
purposive sense. Indeed the very existence of a ‘threshold
workshop’ (NICE 2009) is evidence of one clear means of
erecting a boundary—around which the notion of cost-
effectiveness can be considered—and the level of organi-
sational reflexivity (self-confrontation) which exists
towards this:
[The workshop’s] focus was on exploring whether
there is a need for the ‘threshold’ to be amended, and
if so what methods would be available, and what
would need to be done by NICE and by others for any
possible improvements to be realised (NICE 2009,
p. 2).
Bounding through procedures
One clearly apparent basis for bounding rationality was
through the creation of procedures. These are seen as an
‘‘objectively more robust’’ (Moran 2003, p. 29) means of
dealing with risk and uncertainty as well as a means of
creating short-cuts across complexity. Even after this
complexity reducing process, the procedures described in
the FAD are vastly intricate and deal with a potentially
endless list of variables and permutations. From the starting
point of the considerations of the cost effectiveness of
donepezil, uncertainty was already clearly apparent:
In five (of 11) studies donepezil was found to be cost
saving (NICE 2006, p. 24).
From here a great number of boundaries are described as
being negotiated, adjusted and re-established within the
process of determining the value-for-money of the drug
and refining such an assessment. These range from the way
a specific model for taking account of caring costs was
calibrated:
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The predictive risk equation for full-time care of the
AHEAD3 model was used unchanged, while an
annual mortality rate of 11.2% replaced the risk
equation for mortality used in AHEAD (NICE 2006,
p. 29);
to questions over the extent to which the benefits (of the
effects of the drug) for carers of those prescribed the var-
ious drugs ought to be accounted for:
Comments received during consultation highlighted
the positive impact that treatment with AChE4
inhibitors had on the quality of life of carers. How-
ever, quantitative evidence on the impact of AChE
inhibitors on carer benefits in the form of utilities is
lacking (NICE 2006, p. 39).
…the effect of the drug would be to delay progres-
sion of the condition, in which case the carer would
still be faced at some time in the future with the same
difficulties caused by disease progression. Exceptions
could be if the person did not progress to later and
more difficult stages of the disease within 5 years or
because of death (NICE 2006, p. 39).
In each of the three excerpts quoted here the unavoid-
able and yet relatively arbitrary nature of bounding deci-
sion-making is very much in evidence. In the first quote
(p. 29), the choice of which model to use and the extent to
which this choice should then be adjusted is far from
straightforward. One would assume that the imposition of
an annual mortality rate (in place of that framed by the
model) is based on compelling evidence for the figure
applied (11.2%), although the relevance of this is likely to
be linked to the decision to model the cost-effectiveness
over a 5 year period.
The use of 5 years, as opposed to 4.3 or 8 (for example),
would seem to be an arbitrary rule of thumb—as also
applied in the latter excerpt as a basis of deciding what
should be seen as a ‘reasonable’ adjustment to make to the
cost-effectiveness model in the context of a lack of quan-
titative evidence.
Bounding by experts
As already stated, the utility of proceduralism in the reg-
ulatory process is partly to reduce complexity but moreover
in terms of its ‘legibility’—the outward visibility of rule-
based conduct as a means of asserting legitimacy. In this
context the manifold modifications to the models by which
NICE appraisals are reached, as evident within the FAD,
would prima facie appear to threaten the robustness
(bureaucratically and politically) of this process. The
legitimacy of the FAD however is consistently reaffirmed
by appeal to the authority of expertise—usually in the guise
of the independent academic ‘Assessment Group’. Often
the legibility of their decisions is itself underlined through
justification:
…this study was excluded by the Assessment Group
because the study population was not described as
patients with mild to moderately severe Alzheimer’s
disease by any definition and the MMSE scores fell
outside the range of 10–26 (NICE 2006, p. 20).
Yet in many other cases there is no reasoning given,
with the expertise of the group apparently sufficient to
explain the decision reached:
The Assessment Group reran each of the manufac-
turer’s economic models using its preferred assump-
tions (NICE 2006, p. 24).
Of course the constitution and attribution of ‘expertise’
is itself a means of bounding the rationality of evidence
assimilation. Which academic centres are considered as
potential ‘Assessment Group’ candidates and how choices
are made between candidates is far from self-evident.
Assumptions that publications or prestigious universities/
research-centres are an unproblematic indicator of ability
and impartiality are highly criticisable. And whilst the lack
of a more effective alternative means of selecting experts
may be a good reason for the current format, the presen-
tation of expert decisions to committees nonetheless erases
(or bounds against) the level of subjectivity involved in
theory selection and evidence appraisal (Brown and Web-
ster 2004). The sheer volume, complexity and contest-
ability of evidence which is required to be processed make
the use of heuristics (more or less informed rules-of-thumb)
intrinsic to the process. The inevitable subjectivity of the
appraisal committee is candidly acknowledged in the
excerpt below, yet any similar perspectives upon decisions
taken within the Assessment Group remain invisible within
the FAD:
But there is also a ‘‘gut’’ component to decision
making, and opportunity cost decisions can be as
much influenced by this as by processes of reasoning.
The committees’ gut feelings also have to take
account of the people unrepresented in the decision
process: those whose NHS gains will be displaced
(NICE 2009, p. 10).
3 The ‘Assessment of Health Economics in Alzheimer’s Disease’
model.
4 Acetylcholinesterase inhibitors, of which donepezil (Aricept) and
other other drugs being appraised within this FAD are examples, act
to impede the breakdown-process of the cholinesterase enzyme which
is associated with Alzheimer’s disease.
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Relational forms of managing knowledge: social norms
and trust
Norms of deference as a means towards ‘verifying’
expertise
Sections ‘‘Epistemic assumptions’’ and ‘‘Bounding ratio-
nality’’ have already made clear that ‘the social’ is sig-
nificantly influential on the ostensibly scientific process of
NICE technology appraisals. In many ways it is quite
appropriate that decisions which have significant social
impact—on patients and the wider population—are
socially orientated. However, much of the influence of the
social that has been noted thus far has been found to be
unintentional, docile and/or implicit. The utility of these
assumptions or modes of bounded rationality are undeni-
able—given the need to reduce the complexity which
would otherwise overwhelm the entire appraisal system. So
long as these means of influence—such as socialised
assumptions about the innate validity of science, the
reliability of published data, or arbitrary choices justified
by faith in experts—remain implicit then their potential for
warping the process and outcomes of decision-making will
rest unimpeded.
Norms of deference towards authority and personality
have already been indicated within our earlier discussion of
the use of experts. The language of acceptance towards the
expert authority of the Assessment Group, as visible within
the FAD, displays a taken-for-grantedness of the scientific
rigour and rationality they employ. These experts are not
the only ones which exert influence on the appraisal
committee’s decision-making:
After hearing testimony from clinical and patient
experts, the Committee considered a number of issues
that might alter the estimates of the cost effectiveness
of the AChE inhibitors from the base case presented
by the Assessment Group. At the Committee’s
request the NICE secretariat provided an augmented
base case (derived from the Assessment Group’s
model but amended by the secretariat) with additional
sensitivity analyses for consideration by the Com-
mittee (NICE 2006, p. 38).
Hence there is a whole array of expert groups who have
access into the appraisal process—those from within NICE
and those outside—whose evidence must be considered
and weighed up by the committee. The ‘gut feelings’
referred to above are likely to be applied in this context as a
means of ranking and verifying the calibre of the expert
and the authority of their argument. Weber (1968)
describes the bases of authority as rational-legal, tradi-
tional-normative and charismatic. In this latter sense, those
experts with greater rhetorical skills may render their
evidence more compelling or memorable than other
counterparts. Similarly, clinical experts from London
teaching hospitals or Oxbridge may, unwittingly, be hee-
ded more so than experts from elsewhere due to heuristic
assumptions as to their calibre. All these are valid tools,
used by non-experts to appraise evidence when other
criteria are less accessible, but nonetheless these are falli-
ble and socially constructed.
These norms of deference to expertise are similarly
visible within Kennedy’s (2009) account of his own
‘expert’ role within NICE. The use of an external expert
has become increasingly expected as a means of demon-
strating transparency and accountability—as well as a
means of outsourcing the responsibility (and risk) of in-
house decisions. A problem was initially indicated by
David Cooksey, an engineer and industrialist, who
expressed concerns about NICE and disincentives for the
pharmaceutical industry. Correspondingly Ian Kennedy,
with a professorial background in law and medical ethics,
became the expert chosen by NICE to advance a study in
this regard—presumably based on the tradition/norms of
his prior roles in high profile NHS-related investigations.
Whether Kennedy was indeed the right expert for this role
is impossible to verify—what is clear is that he was not
exceedingly familiar with NICE procedures prior to his
appointment:
I was operating at the plane of a kind of political and
philosophical approach on the one hand and also then
on the other trying to work out what a FAD meant
(Kennedy 2009: 1).
This makes evident how the choice of experts can bear
greatly on the outcomes of expert decisions. Cooksey’s
background, alongside that of Kennedy, will inevitably
have coloured their prioritisation of certain issues ahead of
others—especially where irreconcilable values (cost con-
trol in the NHS versus pharmaceutical industry profitabil-
ity) have to be compared.
Trust as a means of ‘verifying’ motives
The importance of Kennedy’s track-record for his
appointment seems almost certain, with the positive out-
comes from his previous appointments making it easy to
assume—or trust—in his competence and willingness to
carry out an effective role for NICE. Kennedy’s renown,
and the visibility of his role, make likely that norms and
expectations of conduct are perceived as exerting a com-
pelling force on him to fulfil his professional obligations
and carry out a robust study (Mo¨llering 2005). Similar
assumptions are likely to be made by the appraisals com-
mittee in terms of the social norms and obligations acting
on those who make representations towards the committee.
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How these assumptions are applied towards actors with
different interests—as clinician, patient or industry repre-
sentatives—cannot be investigated through the data asses-
sed here though would make a valuable focus of future
research.
In spite of the cynicism and antipathy, as set out above,
which exists between NICE and pharmaceutical manufac-
turers, this was not explicit within the bureaucratic narrative
of the FAD. Although the existence of conflicting interests
could be read between the lines of aspects of the report:
The Committee carefully examined the cost-effec-
tiveness models provided by the Assessment Group
and the manufacturers, and it noted the substantial
differences in cost-effectiveness estimates between
the manufacturers’ models and those of the Assess-
ment Group (NICE 2006, p. 37).
Given the clear conflict of interests which exists
between the goal of the committee and the accounts of
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the matter of how evidence
is received and absorbed or discounted comes to be of vital
significance for the robustness of the whole appraisal
process. On the one hand manufacturers’ data is visible
throughout the FAD and would seem to be necessary in
their understandings of the nature and efficacy of inter-
ventions. On the other hand a certain degree of scepticism
was apparent on the part of the committee:
The Committee noted that the Assessment Group
considered that the manufacturers’ cost-effectiveness
calculations needed to be treated with considerable
caution because: optimistic assumptions on estimates
of mortality and costs were used (NICE 2006, p. 37).
The means by which this ‘considerable caution’ is
applied, how this highly contestable evidence bears upon
the perceived robustness of other evidence provided by
manufacturers, and the nature of the tension between a
compromised trust in manufacturers and the pragmatic
need to work with their representatives—all emerge as
important issues of trust within this context. If trust is
conceptualised as the belief that the trustee will put the
interests of the trusters (the appraisal process) first and has
no agenda to the contrary (Williams 2007)—then the
relation of the committee (and others within NICE) to
representatives from the industry, and the evidence they
present, are problematic and worthy of exploration.
Value-attachment as a result of cultural representations
of illness and the NHS
A further mode by which social factors may influence the
decision-making within NICE appraisals is through the
value-laden means of understanding illness and NHS
institutions as driven by dominant cultural representations of
these within society. In the case of the former, the task of
comparing radically different technologies for use in diver-
gent illness types is a very difficult one. Although the QALY-
based process of NICE appraisals seeks to overcome this, a
level of pragmatism around the cost-per-QALY threshold, as
influenced by value-orientations, would seem unavoidable:
In practice, decision making involves a great deal of
what Professor Stevens described as ‘‘pragmatic
thresholdry’’. Factors that might influence are many
and various. Cancer tends to be viewed more sym-
pathetically, as are children, or patients nearing the
end of their lives or who are particularly disadvan-
taged by their condition (NICE 2009, p. 11).
Socialised norms and the cultural resonance of certain
concepts of illness such as cancer—in terms of a valiant
battle (Sontag 1978)—or Alzheimer’s means that the very
use of these linguistic utterances ‘‘is capable of making
present that which is spatially, temporally and socially
absent from the ‘here and now’’’ (Berger and Luckmann
1966, p. 174).
In contrast, the services which are being displaced by
favourable opinions from appraisal committees are highly
nebulous and distant. Although such ‘at-risk’ services
are not necessarily neglected, the lack of more tangible
evidence for their effectiveness and a corresponding reli-
ance on the ‘gut feelings’ of committee members as cited
above (NICE 2009, p. 10), makes it probable that their
remoteness within the social process of appraisals leads to
their neglect. The FAD records that:
The Committee was also mindful of the need to
ensure that its advice took account of the efficient use
of NHS/PSS resources (NICE 2006, p. 36).
Yet the abstract notion of resource allocation—com-
pared with the visible and interactive presence of sufferers
of the condition under consideration—would seem to make
it probable that the emotional and moral impact of the
illness experience of certain diseases (particularly those
with significant cultural resonance), and the potency of
hope attached to its treatment, have an important impact on
committee members (Brown 2011). Even when leaving
notions of affect to one side, the gap between the threshold
applied by NICE and the ‘shadow’ threshold (the price of
QALY that a PCT cannot quite afford) will vary from PCT
to PCT (depending on funding, efficiency, and variations in
need) and hence there is no way of knowing which inter-
ventions will be displaced. Hence although
NICE’s threshold should represent its best guess
about the measure of the shadow price (NICE 2009,
p. 16),
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in practice the committee has no way of knowing which
treatments are being displaced. This high level of uncer-
tainty amplifies the need for committee members to resort
to a ‘gut feeling’ approach.
Discussion: a framework for investigating the impact
of uncertainty
The findings presented above suggest the existence of
multiple layers of uncertainty. Yet thus far, specific per-
ceptions regarding the format of uncertainty, as to how
unknowns are considered and pursued (or not), have yet to
be considered fully. The social scientific literature per-
taining to decision-making within contexts of risk and
uncertainty offers a number of theoretical insights into
these formats which are decidedly relevant to NICE
appraisals. Knight (1921–see also Langlois and Cosgel
1993: 460) differentiates between approaches to uncer-
tainty which: seek to categorise and probabilistically cal-
culate in their response to uncertainty (‘calculable’ risk);
distinguish between potential outcomes in the face of
uncertainty, but where numeric calculation of their like-
lihood is seen as impossible (‘categorisable uncertainty’);
recognise uncertainty in a more vague and nebulous
manner (‘known uncertainty’). As considered above,
socially-constructed assumptions (Schutz 1972) within
prevailing systems (Luhmann 1979) influence the type of
approach and application of knowledge forms within each
system.
While ostensibly NICE decisions are purely calcula-
tive, the ‘gut component’ referred to highlights the extent
to which ‘categorisable uncertainty’ and even mere
‘known uncertainty’ are inherent within decisions.
Responses within these latter categories may include
applying experiential or tacit knowledge (Lam 2000) and
affect-based heuristics (Finucane et al. 2000). Such
mechanisms—rules-of-thumb, intuition, and trust—are
common and effective modes of decision-making amidst
uncertainty (Knight 1921; Gigerenzer 2007; Zinn 2008).
Trust is an especially vital means of bridging the
unknowable (Mo¨llering 2001a, b) through gauging the
reliability of individuals. Luhmann (1979) notes more-
over how continuous positive feedback from abstract
systems of knowledge or institutions may similarly lead
to ‘system trust’. Enduring positive feedback may even
result in ‘confidence’ (ibid), where potential fallibility or
uncertainty is no longer even envisaged: thus a fourth
format—‘unknown uncertainty’—emerges. The following
matrix represents one possible basis for future research,
where different layers of uncertainty may be investigated
in light of particular (or multiple) formats for tackling
these:
By its scientific approach, NICE has developed sophis-
ticated techniques for modelling cost-effectiveness. Yet
these calculating approaches—in their technocratic nat-
ure—are open to contestation and dispute via legal
challenge. So while NICE was able to extend its access to
(and recalculate) patient data, thus reducing the problem of
suspending doubts in industry information, Eisai (donepe-
zil manufacturer) and Pfizer (the distributor) disputed the
appraisal decision as ‘‘procedurally flawed and irrational’’
(Dyer 2007, p. 1337). In spite of findings that donepezil
and other acetylcholinesterase inhibitors were far from
sufficiently cost-effective for mild stage Alzheimer’s, the
decision was nonetheless exposed to legal contestation and
therefore widespread media debate.5
Lehoux et al. (2009) suggest that novel health innova-
tions are typically contested through three different types
of argument: scientific, clinical and social. These three
aspects are congruent with the layers of uncertainty noted
above and indeed all three emerged within the contestation
of this particular appraisal decision. Deeper assumptions
about the clinical relevance and consistency of the MMSE,
emerging in the form of its procedural application in the
appraisal, were at the centre of manufacturers’ (and the
Alzheimer’s Society’s) objections presented at the High
Court. Further concerns about the economic modelling
were also challenged in this way. The scientific-techno-
cratic (procedural uncertainty) were challenged legally,
while more practical-clinical and social arguments were
raised in the public sphere (mass media)—for example the
difficulty in telling patients they were unable to be pre-
scribed a drug until their condition was more developed.
Thus it would seem that different layers of uncertainty
may be addressed through different formats, but moreover
may be prone to different modes of influence. NICE’s open
recourse to procedures and expertise in the face of uncer-
tainty means that these formats are most open to chal-
lenge—through procedural means (i.e legal process) and by
contesting expertise. Conversely, due to the way that epi-
stemic and relational uncertainty is largely veiled by NICE
behind calculative approaches, contestation of these

















5 NICE revised its stance towards a more favourable position in
2011.
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much less detectable. Yet this lack of visibility should not
be misinterpreted as a lack of influence, rather such influ-
ence may well occur ‘behind the backs’ of decision-mak-
ers: first, due to the impossibility of fact/value distinctions
and the corresponding influence of the ‘dynamics of hope
and expectation’ upon ‘objective’ experts (Brown and
Webster 2004); and second, through the epistemic
assumptions on which the whole system is based (Milewa
2008).
Epistemic frameworks are significant in that, as with
legal challenges to technical procedures, innate barriers
exist to certain interests and not to others. Hence the pre-
dominance of the bio-medical alongside particular eco-
nomic models privileges those interests which function
within these paradigms—the ‘health-industrial complex’
(Meadowcroft 2008; Milewa 2008). Such a scientific-
bureaucratic framework facilitates the rationalising of
instrumental tendencies such as economic and research
progress, while the communication which considers values,
interests and moral outcomes becomes increasingly sepa-
rated off and its refinement impeded (Habermas 1987).
Whereas single decisions may be deemed rational or not in
terms of their realising a particular ‘end’, rationality over
time is a function of an institution’s selection of ‘ends and
values’, its ‘consistency over time’ and ‘self-understand-
ing’ (Brubaker 1984, p. 94). This separation is thus of
serious concern because NICE appraisals have a profound
impact on patients and society.
NICE’s legitimacy is developed within such a broader
context, yet its tendency towards the calculative, in
defending its technical-instrumental rationality in the face
of contestation, leads to the neglect of this communicative
rationality. It is in this sense that more overt contestations,
and more implicit tendencies towards certain forms of
rationality, are very much linked. Legal contestations and
more general criticism of NICE procedures are not only
effectual on the particular decision in question but more
fundamentally have resulted in reform of NICE’s appraisal
practice and other assumptions (Hedgecoe 2004). Fuller’s
(1978) notion of neglected parties is salient here, as is
Olson’s (1965) consideration of the ‘logic of collective
action’, in that interests which are poorly resourced and/or
overly diffuse are more likely to become neglected by
NICE. Contrast this with the concerted and well resourced
effort to review NICE as a possible fourth hurdle to
industry innovation (Kennedy 2009). In the short term this
may mean that the very procedures NICE apply in
bounding rationality may be shaped by certain outside
interests (and not others), in the longer term this may
engender the forming of more profound assumptions—
such as that of the need for NICE to further concern itself
with incentives for industry ‘research and development’ as
well as immediate NHS resource efficiency.
Conclusion: considering the influence of uncertainty
This paper began by denoting the creation of NICE as an
attempt to inaugurate a systematic, neutral and evidence-
based regulation of the use of expensive pharmaceutical
products by the NHS. Yet this attempt to absorb uncer-
tainty and promote objectivity has paradoxically resulted in
an increasingly politicised rationing and amplified aware-
ness of decision-making uncertainty. The core of the paper
described three main layers of uncertainty within apprais-
als—epistemic, procedural and social. The latter part of the
paper set out a framework for considering the extent to
which these layers of uncertainty and the various formats
of responses to them may act as avenues through which
outside interests, for example the pharmaceutical industry,
may exert influence which skews the regulatory process.
This potential bias within the appraisals process may
be more overt—through the ability of certain interests
(and not others) to contest procedures—or via more subtle
systemic tendencies. These two modes of influence have
been seen to be linked. So while NICE is clearly aware and
seemingly cynical (Kennedy 2009) to the motives of the
pharmaceutical industry, this is not sufficient to protect
appraisals within a polycentric regime. Pressures exerted
by the industry indirectly (through the media and the state)
may lead to the regulation of the regulator (Black 2008;
Brown and Calnan 2010) while built in biases engender
neglected parties (Fuller 1978). ‘‘Accordingly, the regula-
tion of health technology… should be seen as a distributed
collective process of which interdependencies and the need
to make persuasive claims are key features’’ (Lehoux 2006,
pp. 157–158).
The existence of unknowables is unavoidable and future
research is necessary to explore their management as a
potentially significant source of regulatory bias. Such
research would undergird the proposals of Lehoux (2006,
pp. 170–186) who presents a framework outlining how
biased tendencies amidst uncertainty could be made
explicit and dealt with publicly. Her five principles include
making values, the various norms of scientific networks,
and the interests of the private sector much more explicit.
This would enable a more ‘reflexive’ regulatory practice
enlivened through ‘socio-political’ debate and would
‘‘make civil society a pivotal locus of deliberations’’
(p. 186). Involving civil society more generally and flexi-
bly (Milewa 2008), rather than specific vested interest
groups, alongside a broadening of the debate beyond the
scientific bureaucratic, may be one step towards over-
coming built in biases. This would enhance legitimacy by
acknowledging and involving more diffuse interests. So
long as NICE decisions hinge on the technocratic, legal
challenge is always a lingering threat. By broadening the
format of decisions (Milewa 2008), and highlighting
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potential losses through disinvestment (Meadowcroft
2008), legitimacy would be enhanced and the potential for
the asymmetric influence of interests reduced. Yet the first
step along this road must be more developed understand-
ings of how these biases become manifest through the
uncertainties outlined here.
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